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1 Introduction
The starting point for this Bulletin is both a
recognition of the lack of attention to climate change
within contemporary donor discourse and a
growing frustration with the untenability of such
a position; ignoring a problem that is so deeply
implicated in prevailing models of development.
The fact that climate change has been so neglected
as an issue by the mainstream development
community should not come as a surprise,however.
Not only because, despite the rhetoric, most
environmental issues have yet to be effectively
mainstreamed within development policy and
practice, but because climate change raises a series
of uncomfortable challenges for the theory and
practice of development.
To the extent that climate change highlights the
unsustainability of the fossil-fuelled growth
trajectory that underpins the contemporary global
economy, it focuses scrutiny on the economic
growth strategies promoted by the world’s leading
global economic institutions, most notably, the
World Bank and the InternationalMonetary Fund
(IMF). Because of the enormous global climate
footprint that results from the increasedmovement
of goods transported around the world as a result
of lower trade barriers, the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) and the governments that
created it and use it to their advantage, necessarily
also enter the spotlight.
Despite criticismfrom some quarters that climate
change assumes too high a status on the global
agenda, it is widely recognised as one of the most
serious threats currently facing humankind and its
poorest members in particular. Indeed, a 2003
multi-donor report on Poverty andClimateChange
rightly acknowledges that ‘Climate change is a
serious risk to poverty reduction and threatens to
undo decades of development efforts’ (Sperling
2003: 5). The relative lack of action to date has less
to do with the painfully slow diplomatic processes
required to secure global agreement on solutions
to the problem than to the vested interests,
governments included, that benefit, in the short
term at least, from doing nothing. Unfortunately,
it is these same governmental and corporate actors
that wield such influence within the institutions
with the power to chart a climate benign
development path, but for the same reasons find it
easier to promote fossil-fuel-led development
trajectories across the developing world.
Within the development community, climate
change has been interpreted within conventional
frames of analysis. It is a problem of bad governance
and inefficient markets.To cite the report mentioned
above; ‘By making public institutions responsive,
participative and accountable to those they serve,
decision making process and implementation
activities can be robust enough to deal with the
challenge of climate change’ (p. 24). It abounds
with “win-win” opportunities and the potential for
synergy and, of course, action is more likely to be
effective if it is “demand-driven”, responding to the
needs of the poor. The purpose here is not to pour
scorn on these development mantras, as many, in
practice at least, contain valuable insights into the
political and institutional dimensions of the climate
change problem. Rather, it is to show that by not
thinking beyond these convenient frames of
interpretation, we miss an important opportunity
to effect more substantive change in preventing
climate change from further immizerising the lives
of the poor by critically revisiting the role of
conventional development strategies in producing
the problem in the first place. I develop this
argument by looking at the importance of policy
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coherence in relation to the policies and, by
implication, ecological footprint, of the bilateral
and multilateral development institutions, the
private sector and finally turn to the potential and
limitations of the contemporary popularity among
donors of climate adaptation strategies.
2 The challenge of policy
integration
Policy integration is perhaps the greatest
contribution that governments can make towards
providing climate protection and it is also potentially
the least economically costly. By ensuring that
policies in areas such as energy, agriculture, transport
and industry are designed with the imperative of
climate protection in mind, governments will be
going along way towards addressing the problem
of climate change in a way that helps to avoid the
need for expensive mitigation and adaptation
projects at a later stage.The goal of policy integration
has been clearly articulated, even if not fully
practiced, by the European Union (EU) and there
are lessons from this experience, which could guide
other governments responses to climate change
(Grant, Matthews and Newell 2000).
What this means is not viewing climate change
as an isolated problem, but rather as a product of
a whole series of policy choices about economic
and energy strategy that need to be revised to ensure
minimal impact on climate change.Otherwise the
effects of actions taken to protect the climate will
continue to be systematically offset by decisions
taken in policy areas such as energy, trade, transport
and agriculture. At the moment, governments’
professed commitments to tackle climate change,
expressed in the Kyoto Protocol, are being
systematically undermined by their continued
support for financial institutions that promote
activities that generate vast amounts of greenhouse
gases. As Tellam puts it:
While the governments of industrialised
countries continue to publicly state their
commitment to dealing with the climate issue
under theKyoto Protocol, they continue to work
with the World Bank, with multilateral
development banks and with export credit
agencies to directly or indirectly finance the
development of energy systems in low-income
countries based on fossil-fuels. (Tellam 2000:
185)
Until now, climate change has rightly been
viewed as a rich country problem. It has been largely
created by the fossil fuel intensive patterns of
industrialisation from which we have benefited in
Europe, NorthAmerica and East Asia.The problem
is that the impacts of climate change will be,many
argue already are, being felt most acutely by the
world’s poorest nations. In addition, the rapid
industrialisation of parts of South-East Asia, China
and SouthAmerica has created a situation in which
the former North/South dynamic has given way to
a recognition that many of countries within these
regions will join the ranks of the largest polluters
within the next two decades.Whereas development
practitioners are used to working with the poor,
with climate change we have to recognise that to
avert further displacement and suffering as a result
of climate change, we need to identify and enforce
a new set of policy mechanisms in the industrialised
andnew industrialising world for integrating climate
change objectives within policy areas that have
traditionally been perceived to have nothing to do
with either development or environment. This
requires us to look not only at the activities of
governments, but at the international institutions
and market actors that shape so strongly the
direction of national development strategies.
3 The role of bilaterals and
multilaterals
Above and beyond other development actors, the
World Bank has the potential to finance a number
of important climate protection initiatives, as well
as reduce the climate-changing impact of existing
development strategies. In addition to being an
implementing agency of the Global Environment
Facility (GEF), the financing agency for the climate
agreements, theBankhas a separateClimateChange
Programmemade up of three components: Climate
ChangeOverlays Programme; WorldBankActivities
Implemented Jointly (AIJ) programme and the
GlobalCarbon Initiative.The Bank also has a Clean
Coal Initiative intended to encourage the use of
“environmentally friendly” coal technologies.
Helping to promote the exchange of information,
the Bank also runs ‘EMPower Info’, a focal point
for information about environmental assessment
processes, the environmental impacts of different
energy sources and about pollution mitigation
technologies. The Bank is also playing a part in
advancing the goals of the global climate regime by
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launching a Prototype Carbon Fund, with
investments from private sector firms, intended to
facilitate acquisitions and transfers of credits from
the flexible mechanisms created by the Kyoto
Protocol.
There are anumber of barriers to theWorldBank
making a greater contribution to the financing of
climate action, however. One of the most serious,
is the failure of effective policy integration; the lack
of systematic integration of the goals of climate
change protection into mainstream lending
activities.According toTellam ‘progressive initiatives
are very small compared to the Bank’s overall
portfolio’ and are generally dependent upon external
funding from developed country governments
rather than being wholly supported financially by
the Bank (Tellam 2000). The fact that sustainable
energy initiatives are externally driven for themost
part, helps to explain why they are poorly integrated
within core Bank activities and tend to be “sealed
off” from traditional operations (EDF and NRDC
1994).TheBankhas, to some extent, acknowledged
this weakness in its paper on ‘Energy Efficiency and
Conservation in theDevelopingWorld: TheWorld
Bank’s Role’, where it is recommended that energy
efficiency and renewables should be better
integrated into the Bank’s general country policy
dialogue with developing countries (World Bank
1993).
If policy integration is understood in its truest
sense, however, the climate impacts of all World
Bank policies should be factored into their
formulation including policies of energy market
deregulation. The Bank concedes ‘unregulated
electricity markets are likely to put renewable energy
technologies at a disadvantage in the short-run
because they favour the cheapest energy as
determined purely by price, but do not capture
environmental and social externalities’ (Tellam
2000: 33). In other words, the ecological spillovers
from existing policies are not currently internalised.1
One report found that less than 10 per cent of all
Bank projects are screened for their impact on the
climate (SEEN et al. 1997). Between 1995 and 1997
theBank investedUS$2.24 billion on the coal sector
while over the same period just US$61million was
spent on demand-side management and only
US$5.9million on one renewable project (AidWatch
1997). Since 1992, the World Bank has spent 25
times more on climate-changing fossil fuels than
on renewables and the fossil fuel projects theWorld
Bank has financed will over the next 20 to 50 years
add carbon dioxide emissions to the atmosphere
equivalent to 1.3 times the total amount emitted
by all the world’s countries in 1995 (SEEN et al.
1997).
To achieve a higher level of policy integration,
climate objectives and environmental goals need
to be placed on a par with traditional Bank business.
This would include goals relating to funding levels
ofGEF-associated projects and integration into its
sector work and the Country Assistance Strategy
process, for example. A recent report on the GEF
in commenting on the Bank’s activities also found
that it had not ‘taken steps to create staff incentives
necessary to put global environmental concerns on
a par with traditional bank business; that it is has
not systematically integrated global environmental
objectives into economic and sector work or into
the Country Assistance Strategies (CAS) process
and that it has not adequately addressed the impact
on the global environment of its financing of fossil
fuel power development’ (Porter et al. 2001).Clearly,
much remains to be done.
The climate-related activities of bilateral aid
agencies have also come under increasing scrutiny.
As a result, climate change considerations have also
been finding their way into traditional ODA
programmes such as the German Agency for
TechnicalCooperation’s climate change programme
(Measures to Implement the Framework
Convention on Climate Change, FCCC). The
programme selects developing countries with high
levels of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions such as
China and South Africa and targets their energy
sectors with projects and programmes aimed at
climate change protection. Similarly, the United
States Agency for International Development
(USAID) has developed a ‘ClimateChange Initiative’
providing grants to address, among other things,
policy reform, institutional capacity-building and
technology cooperation and transfer. The
‘Development Credit Authority’ has also been
evolved providing guarantees to help project
developers overcome market barriers (USAID
1998). Aid, grants and subsidies will continue to
be important, particularly to developing countries,
for financing climate-relevant technology transfer
projects. The financial flows they oversee pale into
insignificance, however, when compared with the
private sector.
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4 The role of the private sector
Given the decline in official development assistance
(ODA),much emphasis is placed on the importance
of private transfers to developing countries in
making up for gaps in public financing. It is difficult
to over-state the importance of the private sector
in proposals to address climate change. As the
Business Council for Sustainable Development
acknowledges; ‘Industry accounts for more than
one third of energy consumed worldwide and uses
more energy than any other enduser in
industrialised and newly industrialising economies’
(Schmidheiny 1992: 43).2 TheUNFCCC secretariat
report on this issue acknowledges the difficulty of
analysing the investment pattern of foreign direct
investment (FDI) by climate-relevant sectors as its
distribution in developing countries is not well
documented and the statistics on the transfer of
environmentally sound technologies (ESTs) and
their impact on GHGs is difficult to determine
(UNFCCC Secretariat 1997). Nevertheless, the
AsianDevelopment Bank (ADB) found that almost
three-quarters of private investment in low-income
countries between 1990 and 1997 has gone into
constructing new power generation plants using
fossil fuels, while the remaining 25 per cent has
gone into existing energy utilities.Only a relatively
tiny amount of private investment has been made
in energy efficiency or renewable energy (ADB
Annual Report 1995 cited in Tellam 2000: 184).
Besides the use of government incentives to
encourage private sector investment in climate
benign developments, discussed above, there is a
role for screening state support to the private sector
andmultilateral development banks (MDBs).There
is an important potential role for Export Credit
Agencies in defining and utilising environmental
criteria to control and, if necessary, restrict
investments made by MDBs if the political will is
there to use this approach. Civil society pressure
can help in this regard. In the late 1980s,
environmentalists successfully mobilised US
Congress to threaten funding for the World Bank
unless environmental safeguards were improved
(Brown and Fox 2001).
One potentially very powerful critique of this
argument, is that what is being suggested here would
amount to climate conditionalities that would
merely add to the burden of the poorest countries
when somany people are without access to energy
of any sort. By placing the idea of tackling energy
poverty centrally, however, it becomes harder to
justify large-scale coal-fired or oil sector projects
on the grounds that they help tomeet the needs of
the poor. Insofar as the plentiful supply of cheap
energy is central to sustaining the lives of the urban
poor in particular, there may be a case. But, even
here, in the context of simultaneous World Bank
and IMF pressures to liberalise these sectors, it is
clear that the poor are not the reason private
companies are willing to take over energy supply
in most developing countries and, as a result, are
often denied access to improvements in services
that may accrue. By far the greatest consumers and
beneficiaries of such developments are industry
and the rich that can afford to be supplied. Often
the energy is transferred overseas.Over 80 per cent
of theWorld BankGroup’s support for oil projects
in the last decade have been export-oriented oil
projects, primarily supplying consumers inNorth
America, Western Europe, Japan and Australia
(SEEN 2004).
In rural areas, more sustainable forms of solar
or wind energy are often more appropriate for
meeting livelihood needs than coal-fired power
stations, for example, which are principally designed
to meet urban industrial needs but which often
externalise short-term human health and
environmental costs onto the poor.The same is true
for oil. In relation to theExtractive Industries Review
commissioned by the World Bank in 2001, the
Sustainable Energy and Economy Network claims;
‘Over the course of two years of examination, the
World Bank Group was unable to provide an
example of a single instance where an oil project
alleviated poverty.Many examples were provided
of oil projects that exacerbated poverty’.
While theremay be a case for supporting fossil-
fuel energy developments in some cases, where
alternatives are under-developed or not practically
implemented, the sooner the transition to
sustainable forms of energy commences, the easier
will be the adjustment. There is no doubt, should
they be willing, that multilateral development banks
and donors could play a key role in enabling that
transition. In many ways, their function would be
merely to assist those efforts already being made
by many developing countries themselves to
promote sustainable forms of energy production.
India and China have begun to put resources into
the development of renewable energy, for example
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and the declaration of the Brasilia Platform on
Renewable Energies set a goal for Latin American
countries to meet 10 per cent of their total energy
consumption from renewables by 2010.
Taken further,however, a critique of an argument
for coherence and policy screening would question
why climate change policy objectives should trump
other competing development goals, especially
whenmany important uncertainties remain.As the
World Bank acknowledges: ‘Striking the right
balance between vital energy development and
protection of the environment is complex in theory
and evenmore challenging in practice’ (IFC 2000).
The issue is not to construct a new hierarchy of
policy priorities however, but tobring about adegree
of policy integration such that policies aimed at
reducing the threat of climate change are not
systematically undermined by the effects of trade,
aid and development policy more generally. It is
not about diverting money to climate change or
creating new climate policies. It is about reviewing
existing industrial and other polices that accelerate
the climate change which the donor community
acknowledges is exacerbating poverty. As the
environmental group, Sustainable Energy and
Economy Network (SEEN) note, ‘Numerous studies
have identified the poor as the most vulnerable to
climate change. In this sense, the Bank’s financing
of fossil fuels is putting its own clients at risk’ (SEEN
2004 and SEEN ‘Talking Points’).
5 A role for adaptation
The arguments rehearsed above do not negate the
significance of adaptation efforts aimed at helping
the poorest and most vulnerable to adapt to the
reality of climate change that they are already living
with. There is a strong case for reducing the impact
of climate change on the poor by integrating
adaptation responses into development planning
as suggested by donors in their Poverty andClimate
Change report (Sperling 2003).Decades of inaction
now mean that short-term adaptation is imperative.
If, however, the efforts of the development
community become narrowly preoccupied with
this admittedly important contribution, wemay be
missing an important opportunity to reconsider
the role of aid anddevelopment policy in promoting
forms of development that are destructive of the
climate system. Clearly it is not a question of
choosing mitigation over adaptation, as donors
acknowledge. Both are important. But to leave
climate mitigation strategies to environment
ministries while development bureaucrats channel
all their efforts into adaptation would be amistake
given the pressing need for policy coherence across
government.
While donors call for ‘steps towards
mainstreaming climate issues into all national, sub-
national and sectoral planning processes such as
Poverty Reduction Strategies or national strategies
for sustainable development’ (Sperling 2003: xi),
the focus is on piggy-backing on other institutional
processes that build ‘the resilience of countries,
communities and households to all types of shocks,
including climate change impacts’. Integration,
according, to the definition used in the report,
occurs ‘when specific adaptationmeasures are added
to design and implementation strategies’ (p. 15).
Again, there is nothing wrong in this at all. But the
same logic ofmainstreaming could be applied, with
tremendous effect, if it dealt with the design stage
of policies in sectors that cause climate change in
the first place.
In an ironic twist, the report expresses concern
about the fact that ‘The rate and pattern of economic
growth is a critical element of poverty eradication
and climatic factors can have a powerful bearing
on both’ (p. xi). It continues, ‘Climate change can
depress the economy by affecting the sources of
growth’ (p. 20).Hence, far from a problem driven
by conventional patterns of economic growth, its
turns out that our primary concern should be the
way in which the climate change generated by that
model affects prospects for further growth.Donors’
priorities are further underscored where it is noted
that ‘Integration [with existing adaptation efforts]
will prevent climate change diverting limited
resources into disaster relief and recovery activities
and away from long-term development priorities’
(p. xi). The statement reveals both that climate
change is not a long-term development priority,
while also overlooking the role of climate change
in causing the very disasters that require recovery
activities.
The report does, nevertheless, express a sincere
desire on the part of donors to ‘take the lead in
internalizing climate issues in all their work’ even
requiring the ‘possible modification of their own
institutional processes to ensure climate
vulnerability is addressed with due diligence’ (p.
29). Acknowledging, as the report does, that
adaptation efforts are poorly embedded across
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governments because of the concentration of work
within Ministries of Environment, which have
limited links and leverage over other lineministries,
could be the starting point for moves to integrate
mitigation efforts across government.My concern
is that what is still missing is an acknowledgement
of the need for economic and trade agencies to
internalise the climate costs generated by their own
policies.
6 Conclusion
Building coalitions for the sorts of climate change
and development agenda I amproposing here will
not be easy and will not be achieved any time soon.
Donors, NGOs and others willing to embrace this
approach will find themselves pitted in opposition
against themost powerful elements of government
and their allies in industry that are strongly attached
to fossil-fuel-led growth trajectories (Newell 2000).
Arguing that there is an overwhelming
developmental and environmental case for revising
many conventional economic strategies may not
make much headway with hard-headed officials
from trade and finance ministries.
There is a case that can and is being made,
however, on grounds of the enormous savings to
bemade from “win-win”, “no-regrets” policy options
that can be achieved in the short term, at little cost
and can be justified on many grounds other than
the seriousness of tackling climate change as a
problem in its own right. Making the case that a
truly “joined-up” approach to policy on climate
change may mean revising some policies, or
dropping others altogether, will take longer and be
resisted fiercely. In the first instance, it means
recognising the nonsense of one set of policies,
allegedly aimed at enhancing welfare, systematically
undermining the asset base on which all economic
activity depends. Ultimately, it means recognising
that if trade, energy, transport and agricultural policy
are more substantively oriented to the goal of
sustainability, there should be no need for a separate
climate policy. This might require us to revisit our
faith in a model of economic development that
appears to be increasingly at odds with the goal of
stabilising the climate system which so directly
impacts upon the livelihoods of the poor.
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